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Abstract: Ongoing reforms of European welfare states that aim at increasing ‘choice’ for 
patients, clients, and beneficiaries provide a unique opportunity to explore what exactly 
drives these reforms and how they reconstitute communities of economic risks. 
Traditionally, the solidaristic bargain underpinning European welfare states revolved 
around the twin objectives of a redistribution of resources and a pooling of risks (Baldwin, 
1990). Much of the retrenchment literature to date has focused on the income distributive 
effects of dwindling resources to explain changes in European welfare states. We postulate 
that more profound changes in welfare arrangements are being driven by the introduction 
of ‘consumer choice’ which is compatible with welfare expansion of new welfare state 
pillars. Our case study on long term care explores in particular, what choices users get and 
whether this allow us to infer the thrust behind ‘choice’ reforms as well as the effects on 
the pooling of risks in European welfare states. We find that welfare state expansion in 
long-term care has responded to growing demand and that there is a great variety in the 
cost-sharing arrangements which cannot all be subsumed under the imperative of cost 
containment.  
1 Introduction
Choice is an element of welfare state reform in many European member states. However, 
the drivers of this ‘choice agenda’ are not well understood. Our argument and point of 
departure in this paper is that potentially profound changes in welfare arrangements are 
driven by the introduction of ‘consumer choice’. This is in contrast to the literature on 
welfare retrenchment, most prominently the ‘new politics of the welfare state’ (Pierson 
2001), which to date has focused on the income distributive effects of dwindling resources 
to explain changes in European welfare states. Our reasons for this different starting point 
are threefold: First, in welfare economic terms the choice agenda breaks with the time-
honoured equity-efficiency tradeoff and thus comes with a novel and robust justification 
for social policy interventions which relies less on solidaristic motives. Second, in political 
terms the involvement of the private sector creates its own dynamic of support and demand 
for more choice. And third, European integration is a complementary driver and supporter 
of the choice agenda at the member state level and, in turn, the EU has strong motives for supporting the choice agenda.
1 In particular, the more member states introduce choice 
reforms, the more the EU gets a regulatory mandate for 'social services  of general interest' 
in the context of the Single Market Programme, if only to scrutinise their claim of general 
interest and exempt such services from competition law (Huber 2007: 5-8).
Before we expand on these reasons in the next section, a brief clarification of what choice 
in welfare means may be in order. In principle, choice can extend to at least five 
dimensions of a social service (Le Grand 2007: 39-40): where, who, what, when, and how. 
Where relates to the choice of provider (eg which care home?), who to the choice of the 
professional (eg a one day care centre or another?), what to the choice of the service or 
treatment (eg residential or home care?), when to the choice of timing (of an appointment 
or a treatment) and how concerns the choice of access and communication (eg consultation 
face-to-face, over-the-phone or web-based). In practice, there is an important sixth 
dimension, namely the question of ‘who does the choosing?’: the individual user, an 
individual agent (a relative, the GP) who represents the user, or perhaps a collective like a 
Social Care Trust contracting with hospitals on behalf of a group of users? The most 
relevant choices in practice seem to be the choice of providers or of services and whether 
this is done by the individual user or by a collective on behalf of the individual (Williams 
and Rossiter 2004: 6). 
Introducing choice of providers does and did not necessarily mean privatization of services; 
it can be between public providers that are given financial incentives to compete.
2 
Furthermore, a very important dimension to delimit privatisation is to distinguish the 
important role of non-profit private organisation in complementing public coverage which 
cannot be confused with marketisation of welfare. But ‘who pays?’ can be seen as a 
seventh dimension of choice if it is related to privatizing social services. Various forms of 
cost sharing for basic services and co-payments for additional services allows monitoring 
demand in line with individual’s capacity and willingness to pay. A related dimension, 
finally is the territorial one, namely the assignment of decision making authority and its 
financing. For instance, it is well-known from the literature on federalism that 
decentralisation to the lowest level of authority (local level) without providing full federal 
funding is likely to make local authorities ration services and introduce stricter means or 
needs-testing.
This leads to a more general point: Choice is not quite as new a feature of the welfare state 
as its proponents sometimes make us believe. But the interesting point for us is that this has 
become a ‘selling point’ for welfare reforms. While additional services against co-payment 
have been a time-honoured item in many insurance contracts, notably health care, the fact 
of additional services was often neglected while co-payments were understood and justified 
as a means of containing moral hazard and thus the ‘cost explosion’ in health care. The 
1 The OMC on health and long-term care stresses three goals, in this order: access for all, high-quality 
adapted to changing needs and preferences, and financial sustainability (CEC 2006, Huber  et al 2007:3-4). 
This is a typical 'motherhood and applepie' formulation of an EU policy document and our paper tries to 
identify  which goals are institutionalised in practice.
2 “It is the presence of competition that matters, not the ownership structure of providers [..].” (Le Grand 
2007: 42)
2choice agenda can turn this on its head: that the co-payment is unrelated to the likely cost 
of the additional service may be downplayed or ignored altogether while the availability of 
more services becomes the centre of attention. It is exactly this shift of emphasis and what 
drives it politically and economically that interests us here.
As will be argued in the next section, we have strong reasons to believe that the thrust of 
European welfare reforms is no longer on retrenchment but has moved on to a more 
positive (sounding) agenda of choice. But in practice quite a few tensions arise and they 
affect the pooling of risks between citizens which will be outlined in the third section and 
later highlighted in our case study. In the fourth section, the research design will be 
explained: We try to identify patterns of choice elements that can be interpreted in favour 
of particular motivations for introducing choice, such as middle-class electoral politics, 
legitimising public welfare or, indeed, cost containment. Our case study of long-term care 
in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom tries to identify 
these motivations in the fifth section. We have chosen this case study because it provides 
the greatest challenge for our hypothesis that it is not primarily retrenchment that drives 
welfare reforms in Europe – if we can show that even here, cost containment cannot 
explain major features, then we would consider this to be evidence for our starting point. 
We conclude with some pointers to further research, in-depth qualitative case studies that 
are necessary since not all hypotheses about motivations can really be distinguished at this 
general, bird’s eye view which our paper casts on long-term care.
2 Why ‘choice’ is relevant in European welfare reforms 
Our first reason for the hypothesis that the choice agenda is a potentially more profound 
and powerful determinant of welfare systems and their change than ‘permanent fiscal 
austerity’ is its more appealing, legitimate economic foundation. The economic rationale 
for choice in welfare presupposes that there is a wide range of social policies to which the 
equity-efficiency trade-off does not apply, opening up opportunities for economically 
equivalent choices. The new economics of the welfare state (Barr 1992, 2004; Sinn 1995) 
supports this view that social policy can act ‘as a productive factor’, to paraphrase the 
Social Agenda of the EU. It has identified two routes through which social policy 
interventions can make the market economy work better: either by compensating for 
market failures such as adverse selection or negative externalities or by allowing 
individuals to take riskier choices that will, on average, yield higher returns. The economic 
literature on user choice and provider competition added to this reconciliation of markets 
and social policy by studying how, in turn, social policy can emulate market mechanisms to 
improve welfare provisions (Le Grand 1991, Le Grand and Bartlett 1993). 
The concept of ‘quasi-markets’ captures arrangements in which providers on the supply 
side compete just like in commercial markets. But the users on the demand side make their 
choice without being constrained by unequal purchasing power, ie the service is paid for by 
the state following the user’s choice, for instance through vouchers or a funding formula 
that responds to demand. “The quasi-market is thus a fundamentally egalitarian device, 
enabling public services to be delivered in such a way as to avoid most of the inequalities 
that arise in normal markets from differences in people’s purchasing power.” (Le Grand 
2007: 41) This redistribution through market mechanisms, ex ante (from the rich to the 
3poor) and ex post (from the lucky to the unlucky), seems to combine the best of both 
worlds: the efficiency of markets with the equity of welfare. Its appeal to users depends 
less on solidaristic motives than on improved satisfaction with the individual service that 
taxpayers or contributors collectively finance (CEC 2008: 63-64). However, we will argue 
below that other tradeoffs may be involved in the reconstruction of risk communities 
implied by user choice and provider competition. 
Second, the political dynamic that the choice agenda creates is likely to be self-
perpetuating (Blomqvist 2004: 152). For one, it tends to be supported by those who are 
actually interested and able to make choices and these tend to be the more resourceful 
members of society. To the extent that choice does indeed lead to the involvement of 
private providers, there will also be political support from the supply side of a quasi-
market. Moreover, the development of ever more diversified and tailor-made social 
services could feed on itself if ‘the logic of stratification (that social groups seek to define 
themselves by separation from others and continuously invent new ways of doing so) is 
likely to create ever-increasing demands for more exclusive and culturally “distinct” 
service alternatives.’ (Blomqvist 2004: 152) Distinct services may again be provided more 
for the resourceful and articulate members of society who are willing and able to demand 
them politically. Finally, the provision of user choice in quasi-markets may lead to the 
privatisation of financing them, fully or in parts, because the beneficiaries do not want to 
wait for authorities to purchase them on their behalf. The privatisation of welfare finance 
would again create political support among providers and the beneficiaries of tailor-made 
services.   
Third, the choice agenda gets some of its impetus from European integration. We have 
already indicated that the mantra of the EU’s agenda, ‘social policy as a productive factor’, 
fits the welfare economic rationale of the choice agenda perfectly. ‘Modernisation’ is 
another catchword by which the Commission identifies a trend that involves more choice 
for users.
3 Moreover and less obviously, it may affect the democratic consensus as 
enshrined in national welfare state arrangements. For instance, EU competition law 
threatens national monopolies in service provision and grants worker, patient and student 
mobility in the European Union that can thus put pressure on national welfare 
arrangements in EU member states (Leibfried 2005). Different conceptions of democracy 
in the EU would each justify the reconstruction of risk communities at the national, supra- 
and even subnational level through choice. The EU therefore has an inherent interest in this 
agenda even though it sees not itself, but forces at the member state level as the main driver 
of a more consumerist orientation in welfare (CEC 2008: 61-64).
3 ‘Modernisation is a response to the main social and economic challenges EU societies are facing (ageing, 
gender equality, social integration, labour market flexibility and efficiency, etc). The necessity to adapt to 
changing needs, which cannot be dissociated from the search for quality improvement, efficiency and cost 
containment, is amongst the most important drivers of modernisation. In a context where the services 
needed are becoming more sophisticated and complex, the need to develop a stronger user orientation, to 
increase user empowerment and to promote access to social rights also play a role in this process.’ (CEC 
2008: 61) A substantial study for DG Employment identifies user orientation (‘more choice’) as one of six 
drivers of modernization of social services and healthcare systems (Huber et al 2008: 16).
43 Why tensions arise in ‘choice’ reforms
The economic rationale and the likely political dynamic outlined above indicate that the 
choice agenda may involve some tensions, other tradeoffs or perhaps the old equity-
efficiency tradeoff in a new guise. As indicated, choice may be politically more attractive 
for resourceful members of society, educated middle-class households, rather than for the 
less well-off (as much as they may like choice as well), and hence be economically 
regressive. This would also affect the image of the EU as a destroyer or a rescuer of the 
European welfare state. The following is a general outline with a few examples; but we 
must leave it to future research to specify some of these tradeoffs. 
Even strong proponents of user choice and provider competition in welfare economics 
concede that a number of preconditions have to be fulfilled for quasi-markets to deliver on 
their promise of improving the quality of social services “without adverse consequences in 
terms of increased inequity”  (Bartlett and Le Grand 1993: 19, cf.19-33 for the following). 
1. First, the market structure will never follow the ideal atomistically competitive 
model of an economics textbook since the price mechanism will not fully 
reflect individual user preferences but decisions of the funding public agency. 
Hence ‘voice’ or political mechanisms of user involvement need to be put in 
place so as to make up for this relative deficiency of the price mechanism. The 
voice of users may also help to compensate for some loss of control over the 
supply side, ie the social service professionals and the cost of their labour, 
which was “one of the major virtues of a monopsonistic public sector” (Bartlett 
and Le Grand 1993: 23). Note also that competition between providers may 
come at the cost of driving out cooperation between providers, eg hospitals, 
which may generally not be desirable (Williams and Rossiter 2004: 12).
2. Second, with a multitude of providers, the problem of asymmetric information 
is likely to get worse: “[T]hese include the likelihood that providers will adopt 
opportunistic strategies in the face of incomplete information; the increased risk 
premia required by the risk-averse providers of services; and the increased 
administrative costs of fully specified cost-per-case contracts.” (Bartlett and Le 
Grand 1993: 26) On the demand side, this is the notorious problem of quality 
uncertainty (Akerlof 1973). Clients will need help and advice to make choices 
between providers or treatments efficiently. This is the basic rationale for 
having intermediaries making the choice on behalf of the individual user but it 
also implies that choice is actually confined.
3. Third, as we know from Coasian institutional economics, market coordination 
has considerable transaction costs, especially under conditions of uncertainty 
when it is not possible to specify future contingent prices fully in advance. 
Under these conditions, hierarchies in the public sector or in firms can be less 
costly allocation mechanisms. Transaction costs also figure on the demand side 
in that exercising choice effectively requires clients to incur some costs and 
search actively for information (Williams and Rossiter 2004: 5).
4. Fourth, the motivation of market actors and social service providers is not 
necessarily compatible. For providers being responsive to (quasi-)market 
signals, they must be driven, at least to some extent, by financial considerations. 
Yet, the clientele may be vulnerable and incapacitated, and the services they 
5need are typically more vital than a haircut. In order to avoid that commercially 
driven providers exploit the power asymmetry in the relationship, the public 
sector purchasers need to be strong advocates of user interests still. Moreover, 
some excess capacity is a necessary cost of choice for providers to be able to 
respond flexibly to demand (Williams and Rossiter 2004: 10). 
5. Last but not least, a particular form of adverse selection or discrimination is 
likely to become a problem with market provision, namely cherry picking or 
cream skimming. It means that the least needy clients get the best services 
because they are less costly to serve. “Only if the contract price varies in an 
appropriate fashion with the needs of the client will cream-skimming not be a 
problem.” (Bartlett and Le Grand 1993: 33) However, even if a highly geared 
pricing formula can incentivize providers to serve ‘difficult’ clients, this may 
lead to mistrust between purchaser and providers as they will have opposite 
incentives to downplay or overstate, respectively, the real need of clients 
(Bredgaard and Larsen 2008: 349). 
The most fundamental tension or tradeoff becomes obvious if we take the political dynamic 
into account. Above all, the prediction that resourceful clients will take up the offer for 
choice more effectively than the less well-off households suggests that any assessment has 
to look at both choosers and non-choosers (Williams and Rossiter 2004: 18). The negative 
externality of providing choice for some on those who do not take it up or are not choosers 
is aptly illustrated by Bartlett and Le Grand (1993: 17): granting choice for users to get 
(support for) residential care may reduce choice for carers on whom there is now moral 
pressure to care at home. Generally, there is a danger that public services, for instance state 
schools, deteriorate because private alternatives are taken up selectively, leading to 
segregation into poor public and well-endowed private services. However, in theory there 
may also be a ‘leveling-up effect’ on public provisions because competition puts healthy 
pressure on bureaucracies to improve their ways (Williams and Rossiter 2004: 9). The level 
in take-up rates as well as the share of different user groups in take-up are indicators of this 
effect on social service provision that can go either way: undermine public services as we 
know them or improve them by providing competition and more choice. For the European 
Union and its inadvertent as well as explicit support for the choice agenda it is a vital 
question which effect prevails.
All these tensions affect the amount of risk pooling and segregation that results from 
introducing choice into welfare systems. In theory, it is not always clear whether this works 
out in favour of more or less social security, or which user groups are exactly affected. For 
instance, does the imperfection of quasi-market structures – given the atomistic competitive 
market as the benchmark – lead to better insurance of so far neglected risks because users 
are allowed now to choose according to their preferences and constraints? Or does the loss 
of control over the supply side lead to cream-skimming and other forms of  segregation, of 
the less well-informed or those less inclined to incur all the search costs involved in 
making choices? Or, to take another example, does the negative externality from providing 
private alternatives lead to less insurance/ lower quality of services for those dependent on 
public risk management of last resort?
6In our research, we will address these tensions and the reconstitution of risk communities 
involved in the following questions:
1. Does the introduction of choice elements lead to larger pools or more separated 
pools of risk? In our case study of long-term care, we will look at coverage and 
access to services.
2. Is the risk pooling/ separation potentially welfare-enhancing because the 
pooling/ separation follows different preferences, not different risk levels of the 
users? In our case study, we will inquire whether use of nursing homes and 
community services is characterized by take-up rates that vary strongly with the 
income level of households.
3. Was this explicit in the original proposal and intended or does it look like an 
unintended consequence that puts pressure on reformers to adjust the original 
policy design? For our case study, this means to watch out for corrections of 
original reforms and/or salient political debates about reforms between 
government and opposition.
4. Did the introduction of choice lead to higher risks for the non-choosers and/ or 
less choice for those not targeted but affected by a scheme? For a preliminary 
answer, our case study can draw on surveys and polls that reveal how satisfied 
individuals in different circumstances are with long-term care arrangements.
4 What motivations potentially drive ‘choice’ reforms
The literature on welfare reforms in general and choice in particular has in theory 
established a number of motivations behind the introduction of choice in welfare systems. 
In our empirical case study, we will make an effort to identify these motivations by looking 
at patterns of choice elements. Table 1 gives an overview of our reasoning.
Cost containment is one motivation that comes closest the theme of retrenchment under 
‘permanent fiscal austerity’ in the new politics of the welfare state (Pierson 2001). A 
problem with this motivation is that it is both omnipresent and yet hard to pin down. It is 
always present since even governments with traditionally soft budget constraints have 
become rather cost-conscious, if only because EU fiscal surveillance keeps on asking them 
to justify unsustainable spending paths. Politically, however, it is hard to pin down and, 
except for instances of fiscal crisis management, can easily be overestimated as a 
motivation. If it were dominant, we should see more cuts in the big spending programmes 
of health and pensions but, one the whole, we do not. Our approach here is to look at the 
financing arrangements for a particular scheme: cost containment is likely to be at work if 
means-testing that restricts entitlement is combined with decentralised financing, for 
instance by local authorities, which creates disincentives for generous funding, and if 
private for-profit alternatives are rather restricted because they tend to be expensive 
(OECD 2005: 28).  
Commercial interests of for-profit providers can be the driving force behind choice reforms 
which is what many social policy scholars suspect behind a 'privatization of risk' strategy 
(Hacker 2004). We would locate them in the fact that for-profit providers actually play a 
prominent role in social service provision, that the authority over financing is quite 
7fragmented (thus increasing the availability of resources) and that users are given the 
option to substitute a public for a privately funded scheme. It should be noted that 
commercial interests as the driving force make cost containment quite difficult because the 
government loses control over finances.
Middle-class electoral politics is the motivation that political scientists like Blomqvist 
(2004) put forward as the thrust behind choice reforms in Sweden. We would see this 
motivation at work if contribution-based entitlement is combined with choice of private 
outside options, either as a top-up (supplement) or for complete opt-out from the private 
alternative (substitute). The attempt at enticing middle-class voters could also be seen in 
providing maximum choice of providers, including private for-profit providers, which cater 
tailored services to well-informed and otherwise resourceful clients.
Family policy is a related motivation. It can only be distinguished as separate from middle-
class electoral politics if it addresses the specific needs and interests of (female) carers. We 
would see this at work if universal entitlement financed out of general taxes (ie no means 
test or contributions as basis of entitlement) is combined with choice among non-profit 
providers. In this, we would see the attempt to allow women to reconcile career and care 
obligations even if their work does not provide ample resources to pay relevant amounts for 
the opportunity of choice.  If family policy is mainly directed at raising female employment 
rates, we would expect to find the same pattern as in middle-class electoral politics, namely 
contribution-based entitlements and choice among providers that includes for-profit 
agencies.
Administrative modernisation is a motivation that clearly comes out of the literature on 
quasi-markets; and scholars who adhere to this approach have advised governments to that 
effect (Le Grand 2007). The modernisation aspect is discernible in the attempt to foster 
competition between public and non-profit providers while there is centralised authority 
over the financing of the choice scheme. If this motivation is prevalent, existing institutions 
are largely preserved, such as contribution-based or means-tested entitlement. We would 
also not expect an emphasis on for-profit providers which do not compete on a level-
playing field and their involvement (beyond some trial schemes) may be too disruptive if 
gradual modernisation is the driving force. 
Legitimising public welfare is another motivation that can be discerned in the early quasi-
market literature (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993). It is related but possibly different from 
administrative modernisation insofar the basis of entitlement tends to be universal, ie 
services over which choice is given are financed out of taxes, non-profit providers are co-
opted as advocacy groups and outside options can be chosen as a complement. This 
motivations shares with administrative modernisation that the central control over finances 
is not relinquished. 
Given the complexity of motivations, our strategy is specifically to see to what extent we 
can exclude cost containment as the primary motivation and then discern other motivations 
in line with our research design summarized in table 1. Cost containment strategies in LTC 
would give limited support for formal residential care (eg communal day care) but not 
8allow private institutional care, favours means-testing and local authority over financing 
because that tends to keep costs down. Commercial interests as the driver, characterized by 
the option of private nursing homes, massive involvement of for-profit providers and the 
possibility to opt out of public schemes altogether (ie substitute) would be at odds with cost 
containment. Similarly, free choice between supported residential care and nursing homes 
of a good quality, ie between a relatively ‘cheap’ and the expensive option of institutional 
care, and the option to pay for additional services (supplement) or even an opt-out 
(substitute), would suggest that middle class voters and ‘productivist’ (work-oriented) 
family policy are drivers, incentivising women to enter employment. Care-oriented family 
policy is distinguishable in that it does not give expensive institutional care options but in 
contrast to cost containment gives generous support to formal residential care and provides 
universal entitlements. Administrative modernisation, including better pay and career 
opportunities for staff in institutional care, and more tailored, decentralised provision 
combined with central finance (quasi-markets) is also incompatible with prioritizing cost 
containment. Finally, legitimizing public welfare, can be discerned in universal entitlement, 
in complementary and supplementary financing of services, and in the attempt to co-opt 
non-profit providers, largely for political reasons.
But we are also interested in how cost containment is done exactly: mainly through limiting 
the choice on institutional care; decentralisation with limited central funding; or restriction 
of access through high co-payments?  The political implications of each of these options 
are different because they are more or less visible and are to different degrees regressive in 
their impact on households with different incomes. 
9Table 1: Choice elements and their hypothetical motivations
Which features 
(columns) speak 
in favour of 
which motivation 
(rows)?
Care service  Finance Provision
residential institutional Basis of 
entitlement
Level of authority Nature of outside 
options
Public Private
formal, 
informal
public, 
private
means-tested, 
contribution-
based, universal
central, 
decentralized, 
fragmented
complement, 
supplement, 
substitute
centralized, 
de-centralized
non-profit, 
for-profit
Cost 
containment
limited 
support for 
formal care
private not an 
option means-tested decentralized decentralized
Commercial 
interests
private as an 
option
[fragmented] substitute for-profit
Middle-class 
electoral politics
private as an 
option
contribution-
based
supplement, 
substitute
Family policy 
(care-oriented)
generous 
support for 
formal care
universal (needs-
testing only)
non-profit
Administrative 
modernisation
generous 
support for 
public 
central de-centralized
Legitimising 
public welfare
universal (needs-
testing only)
complement, 
supplement
non-profit
see text for elaboration
15 The introduction of long-term care in six European countries
Table 1 indicates that we found it useful to boil down the opportunities for choice to three 
dimensions:
 Choice of service: The relevant choice here is between care that takes place in a 
nursing home or in the residence of the old age dependent, the latter typically 
provided by relatives but with different degrees of support, say by care 
assistants or community day-care services. The less restricted this choice 
between institutional and (various option of supported) residential care is, the 
less we consider cost containment to be the driving force.in particular if more 
expensive private institutional care is covered.   To what degree this goes hand 
in hand with administrative modernisation or private sector pressures can be 
distinguished according to what extent public rather than private institutional 
care is the focus of attention. 
 Choice of financing:  The question of financing has two main aspects in long-
term care. First, is there a choice of opting out or paying into an insurance 
scheme so as to be covered at all or is every resident automatically covered by a 
universal public scheme? Second, is there only needs-tested access of services 
(universal) or does the choice over the full range of treatments require 
individuals to share the costs (in the form of co-payments, co-insurance or 
deductibles, ie means-tested or based on prior contributions)? We contend that 
means-testing and strict targeting is necessary for identifying cost containment 
as the primary driver while insurance-based coverage suggests that upper and 
middle-class voters are targeted (without necessarily compromising means-
tested support for the less affluent).  In addition, the centralisation of finance is 
an indicator to what extent different schemes exist that can be chosen, but also 
to what extent competition between them exists that keeps costs down.  Finally, 
these schemes may require some complementary co-payment, allow for 
supplementary top-ups or can be actually substituted by some private 
arrangement. 
 Choice of provider: The choice of provider may be offered, normally dependent 
on the degree of need and te intensity of care required. Basic choices concern 
the choice between public providers, on the one hand, and private for-profit and 
non-profit providers, on the other. With respect to public providers there is a 
question of how centralised and uniform or decentralised and diversified they 
are organised and hence offer choice within the public sector. Decentralisation 
is compatible with cost containment; but it depends on the type of funding of 
the system and the level at which decentralisation takes place (regional or local, 
the latter being more costly) and on the extent to which central public funds are 
available whether this should be considered the dominant factor or, for instance, 
administrative modernisation. An important role of for-profit providers is not 
easily reconciled with cost containment, but indicates the influence of 
commercial interests.  An important role of non-profit providers suggests either 
family policy targeting care givers, especially if combined with some individual 
co-payments since this is an affordable private source of formal care. Or it 
indicates legitimising strategies for public welfare since non-profit providers 
represent important political stakeholders of a particular social policy. 
1As mentioned above, we have chosen long-term care (LTC) for elderly people as our first 
case study because it is the most challenging for us in terms of our overall hypothesis that 
retrenchment is an overstated driver of welfare reforms. Cost considerations here seem to 
be overwhelming: An OECD (2005: 20) study notes that demand for LTC increases 
exponentially in the age group of 80 years and older and this is the fastest growing segment 
of the population. According to Eurostat projections, the number of this age group will rise 
by 50% and more than double in all EU-25 countries except Sweden which already has the 
highest share of very old people in the world (Huber et al 2008: 93).  In all European 
countries, expenditure on LTC is expected to grow markedly (Pickard et al, 2007). In 
Spain, the introduction of a new package to cover LTC implies that public expenditure on 
LTC will rise from 0.3% GDP to 1% GDP (Costa-Font and Gonzalez, 2000). Yet, this also 
suggests that outright retrenchment is not really an option, on the contrary, an ever rising 
amount of fiscal areas will have to be devoted to LTC for older people. 
In other words, cost containment may be possible at best. And there are other motivations 
that may make even that difficult. A study for the Commission notes ‘dissatisfaction of 
citizens with the number and quality of available public services will keep growing.’ 
(Huber et al 2008: 93) In particular middle class households will be able and willing to pay 
for better long-term care, either for themselves or for an elderly relative as this allows them 
to maintain a higher living standard and a life style of independence.  Another driver seems 
to be staff shortages which are a great and rising concern of public LTC providers, due to 
low pay, high staff turnover and difficult working conditions (Huber et al 2008: 95). 
Hence, there is a prima facie case for administrative modernization and improving/ 
legitimizing public welfare so as to retain and attract staff.
In a number of OECD countries, there is a move towards allowing users more choice as 
regards residential care, among care providers and flexibility with regards to the way care 
is provided (OECD 2005: 50; Lundsgaard 2005: 12).
4 Choice typically means that a user in 
need of care is given a personal budget, ie a person found eligible is given a certain amount 
of support, specified as a particular set of services, a number of hours per week or an 
amount of money. Out of this budget, 'the person needing care can choose how to obtain 
care and how to “spend” the support for which she/he has been found eligible; either from 
an agency designated by the public authorities or insurance programme, from an alternative 
agency or self-employed care assistant, by employing a personal care assistant her/him self 
or possibly receive a cash allowance to support informal care. The German long-term care 
insurance comes close to this description.' (Lundsgaard 2005: 21).
This trend holds for very different models that exist and there is quite a lot of diversity in 
LTC, more than in health care generally.
5 In our country sample, Italy and Spain is 
representative of Southern European countries where it is largely provided informally even 
4  The United States, more precisely the states, have the longest experience with ‘consumer-directed’ 
LTC, lasting for more than 20 years, where it means choice over a particular form of residential care 
services (OECD 2005: 51).
5'Even where seemingly similar arrangements have been put in place, the underlying policy goals for their 
introduction may not have been the same, taking into account different starting positions and policy 
context.' (Lundsgaard 2005: 20)
1though institutional care is predominantly funded publicly. Germany and the UK represent 
countries that have considerable more public resources  spent on LTC; a significant share 
goes into support of informal care, allowig care recipients  either to get formal care or share 
it with the informal care giver (Germany), or granting LTC allowances to relatives 
providing informal care (UK).  The Netherlands is representative of other Nordic countries 
in that it spends considerable amounts on LTC but channels these public funds largely to 
formal residential care or to institutional care (Lundsgaard 2005: 12). France is similar in 
its focus on formal, in particular institutional, care but is not as generous as the 
Netherlands, in that respect more similar to Germany and the UK. Services have been 
expanding strongly in four out of the six countries, including France, Germany, Spain and 
the UK (Huber et al 2008: 106)., although this does not show up in the figures from 2000 in 
Table 2.
Table 2: Financing and provision of LTC in 2000
Financing (as % of GDP) Provision (as % of 65+)
Total 
expenditure 
Public 
expenditure
in nursing 
homes
in residential 
care
France  0.5 n.a. 6.5 ./.
Germany 1.3 0.9 4.0 9.0
Italy 1.0 n.a. 2.0 2.0
The Netherlands 2.7 1.8 2.4 12.0
Spain 0.6 0.2 4.0 4.0
United Kingdom 1.4 1.0 4.0 20.0
Source: OECD, AARP European Leadership Study, Costa-Font et al (2008). 
Table 3 specifies what we have found for the six large EU countries that we have chosen 
for our case study on LTC. The cost-containment motive is noticeable if one concentrates 
on cost-sharing arrangements: there is practically no LTC system that would not means-test 
the access to care and co-payments are used to moderate demand (in Germany and the 
Netherlands, means-tested benefits cover those that do not have contribution-based 
entitlements). In three of these countries (Italy, Spain and the UK), we also find a 
combination of decentralized finance and decentralized provision, which restricts local 
authorities. But the slight privilege that benefits extend to institutional care in Italy and the 
role of for-profit providers in the UK suggest that even here a few other motives, such as 
professional or commercial interests, may play a role. Spain stands out as a relatively clear 
case where choice is driven by cost containment, along with some influence of commercial 
interests. They have managed to instrumentalise decentralisation so as to prevent a uniform 
level of services, to create a market for financial complements to public coverage and allow 
a role of market providers to emerge. 
1Table 3: Features of long-term care services in six European countries
Care service  Finance Provision
residential institutional Basis of 
entitlement
Level of authority Nature of outside 
options
Public Private
France Cash benefit is 
fungible
Cash benefit is 
fungible 
Means-tested co-
payments 
Central gov’t 
(social insurance)
Complement Central and 
regional 
governments
For-profit
Germany In kind support 
of formal care 
plus lower cash 
benefit for 
informal care
Lower cash 
benefit
General coverage 
after needs-test 
(contribution-
based, means-
tested for non-
contributors) 
Central gov’t 
(social insurance)
Substitute Regional 
governments
Mixed for- 
and non-profit
Italy Cash benefit is 
very limited for 
formal care 
Cash benefits Partial and 
means-tested 
entitlement to 
annuity
Central gov’t 
grant and local 
taxes
Supplement Central and 
local 
governments
Non-profit
The 
Netherlands
In kind and 
cash benefits
In kind and 
cash benefits
General coverage 
after needs-test 
(income-related, 
contribution-
based 
coinsurance)
Central gov’t 
(social insurance)
Substitute (?) Central and 
local 
governments
For-profit
Spain In kind In kind and 
cash benefits
Means-tested co-
payment
Equal share of 
central gov’t, 
regional gov’t 
and individual
Complement, 
supplement
Regional 
governments
Non-profit
United 
Kingdom
In kind and 
cash benefits
In kind and 
cash benefits
Universal access 
in Scotland but 
means-tested in 
England and 
Wales
Central gov’t 
grant and local 
taxes
Complement, 
supplement
Local 
governments
For-profit
1What about the others? France, another country with conditional, means-tested coverage, 
does not show a clear pattern. A new autonomy pension system, introduced in 2002, 
provided only a limited entitlement but even so the system soon ran into budget deficits 
because of unexpectedly high demand. The attempt at cost-containment is discernible in 
the fact that  no universal entitlement was granted and no earmarked tax was to pay for 
benefits, unlike in Germany and the Netherlands.  Yet the role of for-profit providers with 
centralized financing and a relatively high share of institutional care does not suggest an 
overriding motivation of cost containment because all of these features make care services 
expensive. This shows some relevant impact of commercial interests. 
Germany’s LTC system has a discernible emphasis on family policy that is supportive of 
residential care. Access and coverage is general or universal and it nurtures a ‘mixed 
economy of welfare’. The Netherlands looks like a case of middle-class electoral politics 
with its fungible benefits that leave individuals the choice of service, general coverage but 
for the majority contribution-based, and the possibility to opt-out altogether. Both countries 
allow some choice of in kind/cash transfers or a combination of both, but cash transfers are 
less generous (do not have the same value as the equivalent in kind transfer). The official 
rationale for this is prevention of moral hazard, eg relatives claiming a cash benefit for an 
elderly person living in the household. But there was also considerable lobbying of formal, 
both non-profit and for-profit, providers who saw their markets undermined by generous 
support of informal carers.
6 It can be generally observed that countries allowing in kind 
benefits provide for more choice and support subsidised informal care by household 
members (Lundsgaard 2005). This seems to be a successful political strategy of co-opting 
commercial interests for a middle-class/ family-friendly policy that mobilises both formal 
and informal private sources of care. But it raises the question – which we need to follow 
up in future research– whether more choice of this kind for the elderly dependant reduces 
choice for carers.
Another general observation to add is that the availability of private alternatives, ie choice 
in this specific sense, may be partly or largely a result of time. Countries in which formal 
LTC has been introduced only recently, to support informal care in the family, tend to give 
a larger role to non-profit organisations in delivering care for the elderly.  Countries with a 
longer tradition of LTC coverage, like the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, markets for 
financing care and a bigger role of for-profit organisations appear to have developed over 
time. This also holds for the financing side of care. A choice of financing mechanisms can 
entail that individuals may opt out of the system which is the case in Germany (where the 
public scheme covers just over 70 million people and a private scheme about 8.5 million, cf 
OECD 2005: 81). Complementary private instruments have been developed in France, the 
largest private LTC insurance market in Europe, covering 1% of the old age population. 
Private alternatives were developed in the UK but with not much success (Barr 2004). Italy 
and Spain do not have developed financial markets for LTC insurance.  Hence, it is 
conceivable that some of the differences in this respect are not so much evidence of 
6 ‘Developing a more diversified sector of formal care providers and creating care jobs has, in some cases, 
been an important secondary objective when expanding choice in connection with the expansion of public 
or insurance-based funding for long-term care’ (Lundsgaard 2005: 25, with respect to Germany).
1different political strategies but a result of different stages of development in LTC systems. 
If so, the latecomers are bound to 'catch up' and more choices will become available 
through an emerging private care sector, presumably strengthening commercial interests in 
maintaining more choice.
What can we at this stage say about the reconstitution of risk communities? Our answers 
are rather tentative and more research is needed.
 Does the introduction of choice elements lead to larger pools or more separated 
pools of risk? In our case studies of long-term care, coverage has been general 
only in Germany and the Netherlands, we think because these countries were 
able to introduce extra financing for LTC insurance (with means-tested 
assistance for those not covered). But access to services is an entitlement in all, 
ie every resident is, in principle, entitled to care services if needy. It depends on 
the private resources that the needy person can bring to bear which decide on 
whether this entitlement actually materialises. This 'affluence-testing' can leave 
some groups, for instance low middle income households, effectively 
uncovered as they are above the threshold to qualify for public assistance but do 
not have enough resources to buy private alternatives or make th required co-
payments.
 Is the risk pooling/ separation potentially welfare-enhancing because the 
pooling/ separation follows different preferences, not different risk levels of the 
users? We cannot answer this question at the moment because we do not have 
data on take-up rates between different optional services and what possibly 
determines them.
 Was this explicit in the original proposal and intended or does it look like an 
unintended consequence that puts pressure on reformers to adjust the original 
policy design? In our case study, evidence so far suggests that choice has been 
introduced in response to particular demand pressures, for instance choices in 
residential care in response to quality deficits of nursing homes or support for 
informal care so as to help care givers to improve their labour market 
attachment. In some countries, eg France and Germany, there is also evidence 
for considerable supply-side pressure for the introduction of choice elements, ie 
private insurers or formal care providers, both for-profit and non-profit, wanted 
to expand their markets. 
 Did the introduction of choice lead to higher risks for the non-choosers and/ or 
less choice for those not targeted but affected by a scheme? We did not find 
surveys for our countries so far but it seems likely that the needs of informal 
care-givers, mostly middle-aged women, will only be met in that they get more 
options for support of their work but not the choice of opting out. Fiscal 
pressures will be most felt here and it is inconceivable that formal providers 
will meet the growing demand for LTC predominantly. Even full compensation 
of informal carers is unlikely.
7  We cannot provide evidence for what happens 
7 Even if we take the highest spenders on LTC as a benchmark (Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden), 
‘the total volume of long-term care provided by agencies, care assistants and relatives corresponds to 7 - 
9% of GDP currently in these countries but may grow to 13 - 16% of GDP by 2050 merely to maintain 
current service standards. This is more than twice the total public spending on education from nursery 
schools through to universities which typically accounts for 5 - 7% of GDP in OECD countries.’ 
1to non-choosers, who may fall into this category quite involuntarily, given that 
means-tested coverage in four of our six countries suggests that these LTC 
systems do fail a significant group of households with care needs. This needs 
further follow-up in future research.
6 Conclusions
This paper tried to identify institutional patterns in social policies that would allow us to 
infer the driving motivations behind the introduction of choice in these policy areas. This 
research design was applied to long-term care in the six largest EU countries. We do find 
that even in an area where cost considerations are imperative, retrenchment appears not to 
be the main concern of governments. They expand services in this area despite the 
potentially massive fiscal consequences, both due to growing demand for better quality and 
easier reconciliation of care and paid work for care-givers, and due to noticeable supply-
side pressures in some countries. The milder form of retrenchment, cost containment, was 
discernible in four out of six countries we looked at but only in Spain did we find a 
coherent thrust to that effect. Others had too much leeway for private for-profit providers 
and institutional care to be credibly focused on cost containment.  Our findings resonate 
with more general statements in the policy-oriented literature.
We could not fully answer the question of how choice affects the reconstitution of 
communities of risk for the area of long-term care. But it seems that coverage seems to be 
still patchy in many countries while access is, in principle, guaranteed for all residents, 
although they may have to be poor enough to actually get public support. This may lead to 
a separation of risk pools; but at least they become now identifiable while without the 
entitlement, they were not identifiable before.  Another area of concern is that potential 
informal care-givers may incur higher risks of ending up doing long-term care work, 
somewhat paradoxically because they receive now more support for their care work. The 
benchmark for comparison is again important, however. In many Southern European 
countries, Italy and Spain in our sample, this form of choice in residential care may 
actually allow female relatives to reduce their input compared to their lone responsibility 
before a public scheme was introduced; in continental European countries it may put more 
pressure on potential care-givers and therefore actually reduce their choice.
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